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The Economy and Party Preferences in Multi-Level Systems:  
The Influence of Economic Perceptions and Partisan Congruence in Six Regions 
 
 
 
Abstract 
How does the economy influence party preferences in multi-level states? Using regional-level 
survey data from Canada, Germany and Spain, we show that there is a ‘cross-level’ effect of 
economic evaluations. Citizens thus take into consideration both the regional and the national 
economy when determining their support for incumbents at either level. However, the way in 
which they do so depends on whether the same party is in office at two levels or not. If so, 
standard reward-punishment patterns apply. If different parties are in office at the two levels, 
incumbents at one level are rewarded for bad and punished for good economic outcomes at the 
other level. Overall, the influence of cross-level economic perceptions is about half as large as 
that of same-level economic perceptions. Our findings have important normative implications 
for the signalling function of elections. 
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Introduction  
The influence of the state of economy on the outcome of elections is a staple topic of political 
science. A voluminous literature examining the presence of economic voting during 
presidential and congressional elections in the USA has shown that strong macro-economic 
conditions are likely to improve an incumbent’s prospects of re-election (Erikson 1989, 1990; 
Fiorina 1991; Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001), a relationship that was also found to hold in other 
western democracies (Lewis-Beck 1988).  
In multi-level states, understanding how the economy influences voter preferences is 
more complex. On the one hand, regional-level incumbents may be evaluated based on their 
performance in managing the regional economy. This was exemplified in the defeat of the 
Conservative Party of Canada in its stronghold of Alberta after the provincial elections of May 
2015. The incumbent Jim Prentice was sanctioned for exacerbating the provincial economy’s 
dependence on the oil sector and for responding inadequately to the collapsing price of oil 
(Globe and Mail 2015). But, given the limited ability of regional governments to fully control 
economic conditions, regional elections are also susceptible to being swayed by swings in the 
national economy. For instance, the Spanish regional elections of May 2015 dislodged the PP 
from power in six of the thirteen regions, when voters voiced their discontent with the Partido 
Popular (PP) government’s management of the country’s economic crisis. These examples 
show that the state of the economy matters in shaping election outcomes in multi-level systems. 
But, we may ask: the economy at what level and during which elections? 
This concern has become more topical in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis 
and Great Recession because of the significant territorial variation in the severity of this crisis 
in federal countries, which compounded long-standing historic differences in the economic 
trajectory of regions. The question that follows is whether citizens perceived this and what 
difference it made to their evaluations of regional and national governments. This is what we 
address in this article.  
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Examining the influence of economic perceptions in multi-level states is important 
because it helps us understand the effects of complex institutional arrangements on 
retrospective accountability. The decentralisation of authority to regional governments has 
conventionally been seen in normative political theory and the theory of fiscal federalism as 
enhancing the quality of decision-making and the accountability of rulers. In theory, the 
separation of policy competences to different tiers of authority allows regional and federal 
governments to align policy outputs with the preferences of their respective electorates and to 
be held accountable for their decisions during regional and federal elections (Treisman 2007).  
However, multi-level systems make the task of holding incumbents accountable quite 
onerous for voters because the allocation of powers to different tiers of government is rarely 
clear-cut, especially in economic matters. Both federal and regional governments have a role to 
play in shaping economic conditions in their jurisdictions. Central governments tend to control 
most of the tools of the macro-economy that can affect national levels of income, employment, 
the currency value and the balance of trade; regional governments often control many economic 
tools that affect the economic wealth and well-being of citizens, such as public investment in 
infrastructure, education and training, and welfare. So, both levels are sources of policy that 
can influence economic outcomes.  
This renders quite complex the task of holding incumbents accountable (Anderson 
2006). Because lines of responsibility are blurred, decentralisation might hamper the ability of 
citizens to assign responsibility for the state of the economy. There is the added danger that 
voters will hold rulers accountable for developments they could not influence (Achen and 
Bartels 2016), for instance if regional governments are rewarded or punished for the actions of 
national policy makers. This is made more complicated if the same party governs at different 
levels (Brown 2010).  So, we may ask to what extent economic voting in multi-level states 
conforms to the normative ideal of democratic accountability. 
4 
 
We study this matter by evaluating the influence of perceptions of regional and national 
economic conditions on incumbent support in regional and national elections. The standard 
hypothesis on the influence of the economy is that perceptions of economic conditions at one 
tier of authority should affect incumbent support at the same level of government. Using 
regional-level election survey data for both regional and national elections from six regions in 
Canada, Germany and Spain data provided by the Making Electoral Democracy Work 
(MEDW) project, we find evidence in favour of this, across dual and cooperative federal 
systems, irrespective of their ‘clarity of responsibility’ (CoR) (Anderson 2006).  
We also examine the presence of a ‘cross-level’ effect of economic perceptions, i.e. how 
perceptions of economic conditions at one level of authority affect incumbent support at the 
other level of government. We show that this occurs in settings with vertical partisan 
congruence: when the same party is in office at both levels, support for regional incumbents 
reflects the perceived state of the national economy, while the fate of national incumbents is 
also tied to how well the regional economy appears to be doing. In addition, in settings with 
vertical partisan in-congruence, the opposite effect holds: support for regional and national 
incumbents is inversely associated with the perceived state of the national and regional 
economy, respectively. We find that part of the mechanism underlying this result is the support 
given to regional and national incumbents that are in opposition at the other level.  
This evidence offers a more nuanced and positive picture of how well accountability 
works in multi-level settings than has so far been portrayed in the literature. We show that 
voters can use multi-level elections both to hold rulers accountable for the way in which they 
have governed the economy and to signal their support to incumbent parties at different tiers of 
government. The ‘cross-level’ effects of economic perceptions can legitimately be viewed as 
evidence of an imperfect accountability relationship. However, we show that this influence is 
not as important as ‘same-level’ effects; voters still assess regional and national incumbents 
according to how well they think incumbents have managed the economy of their respective 
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jurisdictions. Moreover, instead of interpreting these ‘cross-level’ effects as solely injurious to 
the proper working of accountability, we show that they are in fact also evidence of voters’ 
willingness to use elections to signal their support to the parties that govern at different levels.  
In the next section, we place our research goals within the literature on economic voting. 
We then elaborate a framework that spells out our expectations, focusing on the conditional 
effect of vertical partisan (in) congruence on incumbent support. We then present the results of 
our analyses. In the conclusion, we summarize our results and tease out their implications for 
democratic accountability in multi-level systems. 
 
The influence of economic perceptions in multi-level states: mixed evidence 
Existing research on economic voting in multi-level states has produced mixed evidence for 
how voters take economic conditions into account when deciding their support for ruling 
parties. So far, evidence has been presented in three types of studies. 
The first type of study examines the effect of national economic conditions on the re-
election of national incumbents. The key finding here is that the weaker ‘clarity of 
responsibility’ (CoR) in federal systems – in contrast to unitary states – mitigates the extent of 
national-level economic voting (Anderson 2006). Moreover, it is the division of fiscal 
responsibility among different tiers of authority that weakens economic voting, rather than just 
the existence of multi-level democratic institutions (Anderson 2006: 455). This implies that 
federations featuring a ‘dual model’ of authority like Canada are more conducive to proper 
responsibility assignment than ‘cooperative’ federal systems like Germany, because the 
jurisdictional (rather than functional) division of competences fosters a greater CoR.  
The second type of study examines the influence of regional economic conditions on 
the re-election of incumbents in regional government. This has yielded mixed results (Brown 
2010). Some studies on the elections of US governors find that the vote share of the governor’s 
party is essentially impervious to state economic conditions (Chubb 1988; Peltzman 1987), 
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while others show that it is not (Atkeson and Partin 1995; Hansen 1999; Niemi et al. 2015). 
This contradiction could be explained by the diminishing effect of geography in shaping the 
fortunes of state economies (Ebeid and Rodden 2006) and by the insufficient acknowledgement 
of the role of partisanship (Brown 2010; Crew and Weiher 1996a). The findings for the US thus 
remain contradictory. Similar inconsistent patterns have been found for Spain (Queralt 2012; 
Riba and Díaz 2002) and Canada (Anderson 2008; Gélineau and Bélanger 2005). Recent 
research on Spain has leveraged the asymmetric allocation of authority across Autonomous 
Communities (ACs) to show that the extent of regional economic voting is conditional on the 
CoR in each AC (Leon and Orriols 2016). 
The third type of study examines the influence of economic conditions on incumbent 
support ‘across’ levels of government. Carsey and Wright (1998) examine both national and 
state-level election results and find that voters appear to distinguish between the responsibilities 
of state and federal officials and cast their vote in function of regional and national economic 
conditions  But, a number of other studies show that the outcome of sub-national elections is 
determined by national economic conditions in Argentina (Remmer and Gélineau 2003), 
Canada (Gélineau and Bélanger 2005) and the USA (Crew and Weiher 1996b; Atkeson and 
Parkin 1995; Stein 1990). The evidence for the opposite effect is sparse and contradictory: US 
voters consider the regional economy when casting their national vote (Orth 2001), while 
Canadian voters do not (Gélineau and Bélanger 2005). 
A separate strand of research has focused on the question of whether citizens of multi-
level states correctly assign responsibility for economic outcomes in multi-level states: are 
voters capable of clearly deciding ‘whodunnit’ (Cutler 2008)? This question is important 
because it relates to voters’ ability to correctly hold incumbents accountable for the state of the 
economy. Moreover, mistakes or bias in responsibility attribution may provide one explanation 
for the contradictory results described above (Brown 2010). Obtaining information about where 
power lies in a multi-level system and which level of government is responsible for different 
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economic outcomes is an arduous task that requires certain cognitive abilities and a basic level 
of political awareness. As a result, research on responsibility attribution has shown that correct 
perceptions vary according to individuals: citizens that are better educated, have greater access 
to information, and that participate in politics are more likely to accurately assign responsibility 
(Cutler 2008; Johns 2011; Leon 2010, 2011).  
But the institutional context matters as well. Confirming Anderson’s (2006) argument, 
a comparative study of public attitudes in two regions featuring a ‘dual’ allocation of powers 
(Ontario and Scotland) finds that citizens’ attribution of responsibility across policy areas 
matches constitutional reality (Johns 2011). Similarly, a comparison of Spanish ACs with 
variable degrees of autonomy shows that citizens living in ACs with high or low autonomy, i.e. 
where one level of government predominates over the other, will tend to have a more accurate 
assignment of responsibility than citizens living in ACs where power is instead shared with the 
central government (Leon 2010, 2011).  It is essential to consider the political context if we are 
to understand economic voting in multi-level states. However, while research has so far focused 
on the effects of institutional arrangements on CoR, it has not discerned the effect of the partisan 
make-up of governments at different levels.  
The presence of governing parties of different labels can lead to the effective 
decentralization of constitutional structures and to the ‘disharmony’ of inter-governmental 
relations (Riker and Schaps 1957), since it allows regional governments to pursue their own 
distinct economic and fiscal policy agendas. Conversely, the presence of co-partisans at the 
sub-national level allows the central government to pursue a more coherent national economy 
policy (Rodden and Wibbels 2002).  The resulting consequence for political accountability, in 
cases of partisan congruence, is that sub-national incumbents tend to experience a similar 
electoral fate to their national co-partisans, in function of national economic conditions (Rodden 
and Wibbels 2010; Crew and Weiher 2006). There is however limited empirical evidence that 
national governments reap rewards for the economic performance of their regional counterparts 
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(Gelineau and Belanger 2005). A further implication is that, in cases of partisan in-congruence, 
voters should accurately divide responsibility for economic conditions, with incumbents at 
different levels judged according to their respective performances. However, in a context where 
incumbents claim credit for good economic outcomes, voters may not only wish to reward the 
incumbent for their good performance, but also to punish the opposition party that rules at the 
other level (see Brown 2010). But this kind of behaviour has yet to be systematically examined 
or uncovered in multi-level elections. Therefore, we study in this article whether and how the 
vertical (in)congruence of government partisanship conditions the influence of perceived 
economic conditions. 
 
Perceptions of economic conditions and partisan (in) congruence 
Our theoretical approach has three components: 
(1) ‘Same-level’ effects: the influence of the regional and national economic perceptions 
on incumbent support during regional and national elections 
(2) ‘Cross-level’ effects: the influence of national economic perceptions on regional 
incumbent support and regional perceptions on national incumbent support; and 
(3) Partisan (in)congruence: the effect of vertically divided or unified government on 
the presence of ‘cross-level’ effects of economic perceptions. 
Our hypotheses constructed based on these components is presented in Figure 1. 
   
‘Same-Level’ effects of economic perceptions 
Our starting premise is that, on average, voters have some information and understanding about 
the assignment of economic policy-making responsibility to different tiers of authority in multi-
level systems. Put simply, they know that the national and regional governments can both shape 
economic outcomes at their respective level of government. Accordingly, our baseline 
expectation is that voters will support the incumbent in national and regional government 
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depending on their perceptions of the economic conditions prevailing at the same national or 
regional level, respectively (Quadrants I and II in Figure 1).  The logic underpinning this 
expectation is premised on a simple model of retrospective voting in which: the economy is a 
salient issue of debate in national and regional elections; the state of the economy is a valence 
issue in which party competition is about which party is best at managing the economy; voters 
punish or reward an incumbent party based on their perception of how well they think this party 
has managed the economy (Fiorina 1981).  Thus, the basic micro-level ‘mechanism’ under-
pinning the relationship between perceptions of the economy and incumbent support is one in 
which each citizen will tend to favour an incumbent if he or she believes the economy is doing 
well, and vice versa if it is perceived to be doing badly.  
Figure 1. Relationship between perception of economic conditions and support for the incumbent at two levels 
  
Support for national incumbent in national 
elections 
 
 
Support for regional incumbent in regional 
elections 
 
National 
economic 
conditions 
 
I 
Same-level effect: 
National economic conditions affect support 
for national incumbent in national elections 
 
III 
Cross-level effect: 
National economic conditions affect support 
for regional incumbent in regional elections, 
depending on vertical congruence  
(H1a, H1b) 
 
 
Regional 
economic 
conditions 
 
 
Cross-level effect:  
Regional economic conditions affect support 
for national incumbent in national elections, 
depending on vertical congruence  
(H2a, H2b) 
IV 
 
Same-level effect: 
Regional economic conditions affect support 
for regional incumbent in regional elections 
 
 
II 
 
Cross-level effect of economic perceptions 
This standard model does not take into consideration the possibility of a ‘cross-level’ effect in 
the influence of economic conditions on regional and federal elections: the two scenarios 
depicted in Quadrants III and IV in Figure 1.  
Here, the basic expectation is that voters use perceptions of economic conditions from 
the other level in determining their support for incumbent parties. The first possibility is that 
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voters simply punish all incumbents for bad economic conditions and reward them for good 
ones. Such a decision rule – a kind of ‘blind retrospection’ (Achen and Bartels 2016) – is simple; 
it may even be efficient, especially if voters have little way of knowing whether the economic 
conditions that their region is experiencing are the result of the actions taken by the regional or 
the national government. However, such a simple decision rule is unlikely. Instead, how voters 
consider economic perceptions will depend on the label of the party in office at both the national 
and regional levels. The reason for this, as Brown (2010) notes, is that there is a constant tussle 
between governments at different levels, as each will tend to compete in claiming credit for 
positive outcomes and will, conversely, attempt to shift blame when faced with negative 
outcomes. This is especially common when different parties govern at different levels. But, 
when the same party is in office at both levels, claiming credit for good outcomes is easier, 
while shifting blame for bad outcomes becomes more difficult. So, voters will likely assign 
joint responsibility for poor and good economic conditions, adopting a ‘top-down’ direction, 
where national economic perceptions shape support for regional-level incumbents, and a 
‘bottom-up’ direction, where regional economic perceptions shape support for national-level 
incumbents.1 We look at each of these in turn. 
 
‘Top-down’ cross-level effects of economic perceptions 
The reason to expect a ‘top-down’ cross-level effect of national economic perceptions on 
support for regional incumbent (Quadrant III in Figure 1) is based on the ‘second-order election’ 
phenomenon, first identified in European Parliamentary elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980). This 
phenomenon is similar to that of ‘midterm punishment’ in US State elections (Tufte 1975), in 
which voters use elections to ‘signal’ their discontent with the performance of the national 
                                                          
1 The presence of ‘cross-level’ voting depends on the fact that the mainstream parties that 
govern and compete at two levels have integrated organizations and share common party 
labels, since this should facilitate a common identification by voters, which ultimately is what 
will guide their partisan preference. 
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incumbent and to support national opposition parties (Kselman 2011). Comparable evidence 
from the study of regional elections in Germany, Spain and Canada suggests that they also tend 
to be subordinate to national-level politics and electoral cycles, confirming the ‘second-order’ 
nature of these contests, especially in those contexts that lack deep territorial cleavages (Hough 
and Jeffery 2006). More recent evidence from Spain finds that the importance of national 
considerations during regional elections is higher among voters with a weak attachment to the 
region and if there is vertical partisan congruence (Lineira 2016).  
The extension of the ‘second-order election’ or ‘midterm punishment’ phenomenon to 
the influence of economic perceptions on party preferences in multi-level states should hold 
when there is vertical partisan congruence. Indeed, studies that focus on the effect of economic 
conditions find that the presence of a vertically unified government leads voters to punish 
regional incumbents for a deterioration of national economic conditions in both Canada 
(Gélineau and Bélanger 2005) and Argentina (Remmer and Gélineau 2003). For example, if a 
Social Democratic party holds office in national and regional government and the national 
economy is doing particularly badly, then voters’ support for regional incumbent will weaken 
as they voice their displeasure about the poor state of the national economy. Conversely, if the 
national economy is buoyant, a regional incumbent of the same party may come to enjoy the 
benefits of a ‘halo effect’. Therefore, when there is partisan congruence, support for the national 
incumbent based on national economic conditions is transferred to the regional incumbent. 
 However, the inverse will occur in cases of incongruence, when there are different 
parties in office at the two levels. In this case, we would expect ‘top-down’ cross-level effects 
of economic perceptions to function in the opposite direction. For example, if the national 
economy is doing poorly, but a Conservative party holds office in regional government while a 
Social Democratic party rules at the national level, then voters will support the regional 
incumbent. If the national economy is doing well, the inverse pattern will hold, with the regional 
incumbent suffering. The motivation of voters is the same, namely to reward or punish the 
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national incumbent party, but the way this affects support for the regional incumbent depends 
on partisan congruence. This yields the following hypotheses: 
H1a: If there is vertical partisan congruence, voters who evaluate the national economic 
situation more positively (negatively) than the regional economic situation will support 
(punish) the regional incumbent.  
H1b: If there is vertical partisan incongruence, voters who evaluate the national 
economic situation more positively (negatively) than the regional economic situation 
will punish (support) the regional incumbent. 
 
‘Bottom-up’ cross-level effects of economic perceptions 
Perceptions of regional economic conditions may also matter for national elections in a type of 
‘bottom-up’ process. The intuition for this effect is that it is driven by a form of regional ‘socio-
tropic’ voting. When making a judgement about the state of the economy and the responsibility 
of national incumbents in shaping these outcomes, voters may take into consideration what they 
can observe in their everyday life, something which is limited to the immediate spaces in which 
they work and live and in which they interact with family, friends and colleagues (Ansolabehere 
et al. 2014). Since voters use local and regional economic perceptions to supplement national 
economic perceptions (e.g. Johnston et al. 2000), voters may attribute blame and credit to the 
national government for these regional conditions.  
However, such regional ‘socio-tropic’ effects may not always exist, especially if there 
is vertical partisan incongruence. Hence, we expect a type of relationship similar to H1a and 
H1b to hold for voters who take into consideration the state of their regional economy when 
deciding how much to support the national incumbent (Quadrant IV). Consider a Social 
Democratic party that governs in the region at a time of regional economic growth. If the same 
party is in office at the national level, then regional voters will likely reward the national 
incumbent on the basis of good regional economic results, implying that there are some strong 
13 
 
‘bottom-up’ effects of regional prosperity on national elections. However, if a national 
government is occupied by a Conservative party, then the positive economic results that are 
attributed by the Social Democratic party in regional government should translate into loss of 
support for the national incumbent. Therefore, two additional hypotheses are: 
H2a: If there is vertical partisan congruence, voters who evaluate the regional economic 
situation more positively (negatively) than the national economic situation will support 
(punish) the national incumbent.  
H2b: If there is vertical partisan incongruence, voters who evaluate the regional 
economic situation more positively (negatively) than the national economic situation 
will punish (support) the national incumbent. 
 
Mechanism of cross-level voting   
A corollary question that we wish to explore is: what mechanism underlies the contrasting fates 
of national and regional incumbents in incongruent settings? To answer this, we must verify the 
possibility that the support afforded to a regional incumbent during national elections for a 
positive regional economic performance will result, not simply in lower support for the national 
incumbent of a different label, but in higher support of the regional incumbent’s co-partisan in 
opposition at the national level (and vice-versa for a poor economic performance). That is, if 
the national government is occupied by a Conservative party, then a positive perception of 
regional economic conditions fostered by a Social Democratic regional incumbent should result 
in greater support for the Social Democratic party at the national level, not simply the 
punishment of the Conservative national government. Similarly, we should also expect the same 
type of effect operating on the ‘top-down’ influence of national economic perceptions on 
regional elections: a buoyant national economy will result in greater support for the national 
incumbent party in regional elections, not simply punishment for the regional incumbent. This 
yields two final hypotheses: 
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H3a: In national elections, if voters evaluate the regional economic conditions more 
positively (negatively) than the national economic conditions, voters will support 
(punish) the regional incumbent’s national co-partisans. 
H3b: In regional elections, if voters evaluate the national economic conditions more 
positively (negatively) than the regional economic conditions, voters will reward 
(punish) the national incumbent’s regional co-partisans. 
 
Data and models 
To test our hypotheses, we need survey data for national and regional elections that contain 
questions about perceptions of national and regional economic conditions. Such data has been 
collected by the ‘Making Electoral Democracy Work’ (MEDW) project.2 We use regional-level 
pre-election surveys carried out during national and regional elections in three countries: 
Canada, Spain and Germany. This source of data and sample of countries offers the possibility 
of providing a unique insight to studies on economic voting in multi-level states. 
Many existing studies that rely on individual-level surveys are dependent on data on 
elections at a single level. While they can examine variations in the prevalence of economic 
voting at the national level across countries (Anderson 2006) or the regional level within a 
country (Alonso 2011; Leon and Orriols 2016), they are not able to assess comprehensively 
how accountability works in a multi-level system. This requires, rather, comparing data on how 
voters in the same region hold both their regional and national rulers accountable for economic 
outcomes prevailing at those respective levels (standard economic voting), but also at different 
levels (‘cross-level’ economic voting).3 
                                                          
2 We would like to thank the project for kindly agreeing to share their data with us. 
3 The only other study that does this explicitly (Gelineau and Belanger 2005) relies on 
economic and electoral aggregate results, rather than survey responses. 
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Moreover, these three countries allow us to have a remarkably broad representation of 
federal systems with different levels of CoR: from a dual-federation (Canada) to a cooperative 
federation (Germany), to a system with an intermediate degree of inter-dependence (Spain). 
Adapting Elazar’s (1987) distinction between self-rule as the territorial autonomy of regional 
governments and shared-rule as their involvement in federal policy, we expect the CoR to be 
highest (weakest), in systems where self-rule is high and shared rule is low (high). Scores on 
each of these dimensions from Hooghe et al. (2016) are presented in the table below.4 
Table 1. Self-Rule and Shared-Rule Scores for three federations 
Country Self-Rule (out of 15) Shared-Rule (out of 9) 
Canada 
(Provinces) 15.0 5.0 
Spain 
(Autonomous Communities) 13.0 1.5 
Germany 
(Länder) 12.0 9.0 
Source: Hooghe et al (2016) 
We have not put forward an explicit hypothesis about the influence of CoR on economic 
voting, but with this sample, we are nevertheless in a position to evaluate the effect of 
institutional arrangements by studying whether or not regional economic voting takes place 
where it is least expected, i.e. in cooperative systems where the power of regional governments 
to shape economic outcomes is circumscribed (Germany), compared to where it is most 
expected, i.e. in dual federal systems where voters can distinguish the responsibilities of rulers 
at different levels (Canada). If we find that all these systems show signs of regional economic 
voting and are prone to cross-level economic voting, we will have produced some evidence that 
durable institutional arrangements are potentially less significant than temporary party-political 
constellations in shaping the way accountability works in practice in multi-level systems. 
                                                          
4 The differences extend to the organizational integration of parties. Parties in Spain and 
Germany are vertically integrated, while in Canada they tend to be stratarchal organizations 
(Carty 2004), with few organizational linkages and different policy positions (Thorlakson 2009, 
2011). This is especially true in Quebec, where parties are effectively provincial-level 
organizations that are ‘truncated’ from their federal counterparts. The implication is that we 
expect weaker cross-level voting in Canada, and especially Quebec. 
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Table 2. Partisan (in) congruence and expected effect of national/regional economy 
Elections Year 
 
National 
incumbent 
 
Regional 
incumbent 
Expected effect of 
national economy 
Expected effect of 
regional economy 
National 
      
Catalonia 2011 PSOE CiU + (H1a) - (H3b) 
Madrid 2011 PSOE PP + (H1a) - (H3b) 
L.Saxony 2013 CDU/CSU/FDP SPD/Green + (H1a) - (H3b) 
Bavaria 2013 CDU/CSU/FDP CSU/FDP + (H1a) + (H3a) 
Quebec 2015 Conservative Liberal + (H1a) - (H3b) 
Ontario 2015 Conservative Liberal + (H1a) - (H3b) 
      
Regional 
      
Catalonia 2012 PP CiU - (H2b) + (H1b) 
L.Saxony 2013 CDU/CSU/FDP CDU/FDP + (H2a) + (H1b) 
Bavaria 2013 CDU/CSU/FDP CSU/FDP + (H2a) + (H1b) 
Ontario 2011 Conservative Liberal - (H2b) + (H1b) 
Quebec 2012 Conservative Liberal - (H2b) + (H1b) 
 
Table 2 above summarizes the units (region and election year) for which we have survey 
data, the party label of the national and regional incumbents and the direction of the effect of 
partisan (in)congruence on the associated hypotheses. For national elections, we have data from 
two regions in Spain (Madrid and Catalonia, 2011), two regions in Germany (Lower Saxony 
and Bavaria, 2013) and two regions in Canada (Quebec and Ontario, 2015).5 In Spain, there 
was vertical incongruence: the PSOE was in power nationally, while the PP was in government 
in Madrid and the CiU in Catalonia. In Germany, there was also incongruence in Lower Saxony 
as the regional government was SPD/Green and the national government CDU/CSU/FDP. In 
Bavaria, there was congruence, with a CSU/FDP government regionally. In Canada, there was 
incongruence as the federal government was occupied by the Conservative party in 2015, while 
the provincial governments of Ontario and Quebec were both ruled by the Liberal party, elected 
in 2013 and 2014 respectively. For regional elections, we have data from pre-election surveys 
                                                          
5 Sample sizes: Madrid, n=976; Catalonia, n=951; Lower Saxony, n=975; Bavaria, n=4691; 
Ontario, n=1856; Quebec, n=1853. The surveys are pre and post election two-panel surveys, 
with the exception of Bavaria (five-wave panel). Surveys were carried out online with 
representative samples. We only use questions from the pre-election panel wave in our analysis. 
For more information, see: http://electoraldemocracy.com/voter-behaviour. 
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from one region in Spain (Catalonia, 2012), two regions in Germany (Lower Saxony and 
Bavaria, 2013) and one regions in Canada (Quebec 2012).6 There was congruence in Lower 
Saxony and Bavaria (CDU/CSU/FDP governments) and incongruence in Catalonia (PP 
nationally, CiU regionally) and Quebec (Conservative nationally, Liberal regionally).  
 
Outcome and predictor variables  
The outcome variable in the core models is the like-dislike score for the governing party at the 
national and the regional level. When more than one party was the incumbent, we took the 
highest score among all government parties.7 We chose like-dislike scores for two reasons: first, 
like-dislike scores are more responsive to voter perceptions than vote choice, making effects of 
economic perceptions easier to detect; second, using like-dislike scores enables us to include as 
a predictor variables capturing party identification, which are often perfectly correlated with 
vote choice; third, the effects of perceptions on like-dislike scores are more comparable across 
contexts than the effects on vote choice probabilities. We present models using vote choice as 
the outcome variable in the Appendix. 
The key independent variables are the perceptions of national and regional economic 
conditions. In the surveys, economic perceptions were measured by asking respondents whether 
economic conditions had improved nationally and regionally over the last twelve months. Since 
just three response options were provided (better/about the same/worse), we treat this variable 
                                                          
6 Sample sizes: Catalonia, n=993; Lower Saxony, n=983; Bavaria, n=5906; Ontario, n=2616; 
Quebec, n=990. 
7 Results are unchanged if we only take the main governing party for the dependent variable, 
which is in any case only relevant in Germany (Bavaria and Lower Saxony). 
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as categorical.8 The distribution of perceptions is presented in Figure 2 for national elections 
and Figure 3 for regional elections.9  
Figure 2. Perceived economic conditions, national elections 
 
 If we look at the results for national elections in Figure 3, we see that the Great Recession 
has had a visible impact on people’s assessment of economic conditions, especially in Spain 
where far more respondents consider that the state of the economy is worse than either same or 
better. A similar, though less gloomy picture emerges in Quebec and Ontario, while in contrast, 
in Germany, a plurality of people consider that economic conditions are generally the same. 
Interestingly, respondents across all countries are more optimistic about the state of their 
regional economy than the national economy. In Spain, the share of respondents that believe 
that the regional economy is doing worse is smaller than the proportion that think the national 
                                                          
8 In our models, we include the perceptions of same-level economic conditions (either national 
or regional) as a categorical variable. We then include cross-level economic perceptions relative 
to the same-level economic perceptions. Specifically, we add a categorical variable that is 0 if 
the perceptions are the same for both levels, with one binary variable capturing whether the 
cross-level perception is better and one binary variable capturing whether the cross-level 
perception is worse. 
9 The bivariate correlations between national and regional economic perceptions are positive, 
but not very strong. The highest Cramer's V is for the 2011 Ontario regional election (0.48), 
the lowest for the Madrid survey at the 2011 national election (0.10). 
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economy is doing worse, and a higher share think the regional economy is the same. Similar 
trends can be observed in Bavaria, Saxony and to a lesser extent, Ontario, where a greater share 
of respondents think the regional economy is the same, and a smaller share of respondents that 
think the regional economy is doing worse. Respondents in Quebec hold similar views of the 
state of the national and regional economy.  
Figure 3. Perceived economic conditions, regional elections 
 
These results are generally replicated when we look at regional elections (Figure 4), in 
particular for regions like Bavaria, where respondents continue to be more upbeat about the 
national and regional economy. A similar pattern is found in Lower Saxony, although 
assessments of the national economy are slightly worse. In Catalonia, respondents seem to be 
equally pessimistic about the worsening condition of both the national and regional economy 
in regional elections. The most significant difference is found in Quebec and Ontario, where 
respondents seem to be more upbeat about economic conditions at both levels than during 
national elections. Thus, across all six regions, we find that perceptions of the national and 
regional economy during national and regional elections tend to be correlated within regions 
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over different types of elections, but that respondents nevertheless do distinguish between the 
two levels of the economy which they are asked to consider. 
 
Controls 
In the models, we control for basic predictors of support for national and regional incumbents: 
gender (male=1), age (in years), education level (country-specific scales, higher values indicate 
higher level of qualification), urban or rural residence (5-level measure, treated as continuous, 
high values indicate rural residence) and, importantly, a respondent’s own financial position 
(worsened/improved). We also control for the respondent’s left-right position; we include a 
quadratic term as well in order to better account for non-linear effects of ideology, for instance 
if citizens at the extreme left and the extreme right oppose the incumbent. We also control for 
positions on taxes and redistribution. We introduce further controls for the respondents’ 
position on migration and their satisfaction with democracy at the regional and national level.  
We also include a control for the strength of regional identity or national identity. In 
multinational states like Canada or Spain, citizens living in territories that feature national 
minorities like the Quebecers or the Catalans, and to a lesser extent, the Bavarians, profess a 
sentiment of national belonging that is culturally and historically distinct from the majority 
group. This regional identity will influence the way that citizens interpret the economic 
conditions that prevail at various territorial levels: voters that declare a strong feeling of regional 
identity may be more likely express pride in the activities of their regional rulers and therefore 
believe that the regional economy is doing well. Importantly, we also include party 
identification as a control, as this variable can explain a lot of the variation in terms of both 
government support and economic perceptions and is therefore an important confounder. 
Partisan support is a well-known influence on economic perceptions, to the extent that there is 
a debate about the extent to which economic perceptions reflect partisan bias or actual economic 
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conditions (Evans and Andersen 2006; Gerber and Huber 2010). We code party identification 
for the parties in national and regional government, respectively.  
Where possible, we also include the like-dislike score for the regional incumbent party 
when predicting support for the national incumbent, and vice versa. If the two incumbents are 
from the same party, this control is not available, since like-dislike scores are only measured 
for each party.10 The precise coding of the control variables is presented in Appendix 4. 
 
Results 
The full regression results for national and regional elections can be found in Appendix 1 to 3. 
To ease interpretation of these results, we make use of the predicted level of incumbent support, 
calculated in our case by holding all other variables in the model at their observed values and 
changing the level of the variable of interest.  
 
‘Same-level’ effects of economic perceptions 
Let us consider first the effect of ‘same-level’ economic perceptions. Figures 4 and 5 present 
the predicted effect on the 0-10 like-dislike score for the incumbent party of changing perceived 
economic perceptions from worse to same and worse to better.  
Looking first across the six national elections in Figure 4, it is clear that national 
economic perceptions are associated with increasing support for national incumbents. For 
instance, in Quebec the predicted level of incumbent party support if the citizen has positive 
economic perceptions (‘better’) is about 2.5 unit higher than if the citizen has negative 
economic perceptions (‘worse’). This difference is statistically significant at the .05 level. Thus, 
the better perceived the national economy, the more likely the individual is to like the national 
                                                          
10 The observed levels of multicollinearity in the models remains at acceptable levels (i.e., 
below a variance inflation factor of 4) in the models, despite the extensive set of controls. 
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incumbent government. Interestingly, and contrary to received wisdom, this relationship holds 
across the different types of dual, cooperative and intermediate federal systems, irrespective of 
the degree of clarity in the responsibilities assigned to federal and regional governments. 
Figure 4. Marginal effect (first differences) of national economic perceptions on support for national incumbent 
 
Note: Figure shows predicted effect of moving from a negative economic perception (‘worse’) to a neutral (‘same’) 
or positive (‘better’) perception. The outcome variable is the 0-10 like-dislike score for the incumbent party. 
Results based on Table A.1.  
 
The pattern of effects is similar at the regional level: across all five cases, regional economic 
perceptions are strongly and significantly associated with support for the regional incumbent. 
Figure 5 shows, for instance, that in Ontario someone with positive regional economic 
perceptions is predicted to have a like-dislike score for the regional incumbent party that is 
about 2.1 higher than the predicted score for those with negative perceptions. Similar effects 
are found in all regions, with the partial exception of Catalonia, where patterns are less 
consistent. Thus, in contrast to the contradictory findings on regional economic voting present 
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in the literature, we provide clear evidence that voters hold regional incumbents accountable 
for perceived regional economic conditions. 
Figure 5: Marginal effect (first differences) of regional economic perceptions on support for regional incumbent 
Note: Figure shows predicted effect of moving from a negative economic perception (‘worse’) to a neutral (‘same’) 
or positive (‘better’) perception. The outcome variable is the 0-10 like-dislike score for the incumbent party. 
Results based on Table A.2.  
 
‘Cross-level’ effects of economic perceptions 
Turning to the ‘top-down’ effect of national economic perceptions on support for regional 
incumbents, we identify varied effects according to patterns of vertical partisan (in) congruence. 
We can see in Figure 6 that in regions with vertical partisan congruence (Lower Saxony and 
Bavaria), the predicted probability of voting for the incumbent regional government is higher 
if the national economy is viewed more positively than the regional economy, and vice versa.11 
                                                          
11 Note that in Lower Saxony there is no effect of thinking the national economy is doing worse 
than the regional economy; this can be interpreted as showing that regional incumbents are 
insulated from less positive national economic perceptions of a co-partisan government 
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There is thus clear evidence in support of H1a, predicating a second-order election effect in the 
case of vertically congruent governments. In contrast, in incongruent settings, we find the 
reverse pattern, supporting H1b: in Ontario and Catalonia, support for the regional incumbent 
decreases if the national economic conditions are viewed more positively than regional 
conditions. The effects for Quebec are unclear and not statistically significant. In sum, due to 
their distinct partisanship, these regional incumbents are either insulated from perceptions of 
national economic conditions (Quebec), or suffer a fate opposite to that of national incumbents. 
Note however that the full results (reported in the Appendix) indicate that the magnitude 
of the ‘cross-level’ effects, at about 0.5 to 1 points on the 10-point scale, is at most about half 
the size of that for ‘same-level’ economic perceptions. So, while the level of support for regional 
incumbents can be affected by perceived national economic conditions and vertical partisan 
(in)congruence, it still depends primarily to the state of the economy at the same regional level.  
 
Figure 6: Marginal effect (first differences) of national economic perceptions on support for regional 
incumbents 
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Note: Figure shows predicted effect of thinking that the national economy is doing worse or better than the regional 
economy, compared to thinking the two are doing equally well. The outcome variable is the 0-10 like-dislike score 
for the regional incumbent party. Results based on Table A.2.  
 
Looking next at national incumbents, Figure 7 shows that the ‘bottom-up’ effects of 
regional economic perceptions on support for national incumbents also depend on the pattern 
of vertical partisan (in)congruence. In regions with vertically incongruent governments 
(Catalonia, Madrid, Lower Saxony, Quebec and Ontario), more positive perceptions of the 
regional economy compared to the national economy are associated with lower levels of support 
for the national incumbent party. The effects in Madrid, Ontario and Quebec are statistically 
significant at the 0.1 level. More negative perceptions of the regional economy compared to the 
national economy lead to an increase in support for the national incumbent’s party in Catalonia, 
Madrid and Ontario (though effects are significant only at the 0.1 level in Catalonia and 
Madrid). This confirms H2b. In Bavaria, a region with vertical partisan congruence, the effect 
is the opposite: more positive (negative) regional economic perceptions compared to national 
economic perceptions are linked to higher (lower) support for the national government, 
confirming H2a. There is thus support for the presence of a ‘bottom-up’ second-order effect, 
providing some support for our intuition that voters are swayed by the state of the economy in 
their immediate surroundings and engage in a form of regional ‘socio-tropic’ voting when 
determining their support for national incumbents. 
However, note again that while the magnitude of these effects is not small, it is only 
about half that found for national economic perceptions: in Figure 6, effects are about 0.5, 
whereas the effects of the national economic perceptions are at least twice that. So, while we 
again find support for a degree of ‘cross-level’ effects of economic perceptions, the direction 
of which is determined by the presence of vertical partisan (in) congruence, national incumbents 
are still evaluated more based on the perceived state of the national economy.  
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Figure 7. Marginal effect (first differences) of regional economic perceptions on support for national incumbent 
 
Note: Figure shows predicted effect of thinking that the regional economy is doing worse or better than the national 
economy, compared to thinking the two are doing equally well. The outcome variable is the 0-10 like-dislike score 
for the incumbent party. Results based on Table A.1.  
 
 
Mechanisms of cross-level voting 
Finally, we wished to know why national and regional incumbents experience dissimilar fates 
in incongruent settings. For instance, if the regional economy is doing well, do voters in national 
elections evaluate the national incumbent more negatively or do they reward the regional 
incumbent’s co-partisans in opposition at the national level? 
From the bottom part of Figure 8 we can see that, in national elections, the ‘bottom-up’ 
support for the regional incumbent party in national opposition is higher if perceived regional 
economic conditions are better than national ones. This is true in all 5 contexts, with the effects 
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in Quebec significant at the 0.1 level.12 On the other hand, if regional economic conditions are 
perceived as worse than national economic conditions, this tends to decrease support for the 
regional incumbent in national elections, though the clarity of this effect varies. Overall, this 
provides support for H3a. Are the co-partisans of national incumbents at the regional level 
similarly rewarded for positive national economic conditions? The data to answer this question 
are only available for Ontario and Catalonia. However, the results, shown in the top part of 
Figure 8 are consistent with H4b: support for the national incumbent party in regional 
opposition increases (decreases) as if perceived national economic conditions are better (worse) 
than perceived regional economic conditions. 
We thus have a more complete picture of the mechanism of ‘cross-level’ effects of 
economic perceptions in incongruent settings. There is evidence for the contention that national 
and regional incumbents are not being blindly punished for positively perceived economic 
conditions prevailing at the other level. What is happening is that co-partisans in regional and 
national opposition are reaping the rewards of their colleagues’ good performance in steering 
positive outcomes for the national or regional economy.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 This is consistent with what we know about the party system of Quebec and the organizational 
structure of the Liberal party. The territorial cleavage and presence of the Parti Quebecois (PQ) 
as a left-wing regionalist party means that the Liberal party is on the centre-right of a bipolar 
party system with a salient territorial dimension. This has created incentives for the Liberal 
party to split the party organization. The Ontarian party system resembles more closely the 
federal party system, in which the Liberal is a centrist opposition to the centre-right 
Conservative party, and in competition with a left-wing NDP. The provincial and federal 
branches of the Liberal party are therefore more integrated and their shared party labels are 
more meaningful to voters. Thus, it is in that region (Ontario) in which the party has stronger 
organizational linkages between levels that we find stronger evidence of ‘cross-level’ voting 
mechanism proposed by H3. 
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Figure 8: Predicted effect of economic perceptions on support for incumbent national party in regional elections 
and for incumbent regional party in national elections 
Note: Figure shows predicted effect of thinking that the national/regional economy is doing worse or better than 
the regional/national economy, compared to thinking the two are doing equally well. The outcome variable is the 
0-10 like-dislike score for the national/regional incumbent party. Results based on Table A.3.  
 
 
The effects of controls 
The effects that we find for the influence of economic perceptions in national and regional 
elections hold while controlling for the effects of party identification. Party identification has a 
very strong impact on like-dislike scores, but does not completely account for the effects of 
perceived economic conditions. Hence, the patterns we find in Figures 4 to 8 do not just result 
from the fact that both economic perceptions and government support result from partisan 
sympathies. To further ensure that our findings are not due to partisan bias in economic 
perceptions, we re-ran our analyses excluding all individuals who expressed a partisan identity. 
While the results for these smaller samples are less often statistically significant, they point in 
the same direction as the main results. We present this finding in Appendix 6. 
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The results for regional and national identity show that there is no consistent effect of 
this variable on vote choice in national or regional elections. When we consider national 
elections, the only significant effect in the expected direction is that for national identity in 
Catalonia, Lower Saxony and Ontario; in the other regions, the effects are not statistically 
significant. If we consider regional elections, we find a significant effect in the expected 
direction for Catalonia, Bavaria and Quebec, and no significant effect for Lower Saxony. 
Surprisingly, the significant effects for Quebec are in the opposite direction to that expected. 
Finally, satisfaction with national and regional democracy generally work as expected: those 
satisfied with democracy tend to support the incumbent at that level. 
 
Conclusion 
The state of the economy is always going to be an important consideration for voters, especially 
during an economic recession. It is all the more important in multi-level states, where both 
federal and regional governments have the policy tools to influence economic conditions within 
their jurisdictions. But, as the campaigns and results of recent elections in Canada and Spain 
show, how economic conditions prevailing at different levels affect the outcome of regional 
and national elections is something that still needs to be elucidated.  
This is what we aimed to do in this article. After noting the inconsistent results existing 
in the literature, we developed an analytical framework that focused on the lynchpin of 
democratic accountability in multi-level states, namely, how individual voters’ perceptions of 
the regional and national economy affect support for the incumbent parties in regional and 
national government. We were interested in ‘same-level’ as well as ‘cross-level’ economic 
voting, and in the conditional effect of vertical partisan (in)congruence.  
Using new data from the MEDW project, we found evidence for the effect of ‘same-
level’ economic perceptions: positive economic perceptions tends to be associated with greater 
support for the incumbent at each respective levels of authority. What is worth highlighting is 
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that this effect is found in both ‘dual’ systems like Canada, ‘cooperative’ systems like Germany, 
and more intermediate systems like Spain.  In contrast to the findings generated by Anderson’s 
(2006) cross-national analysis and Leon and Orriols’ (2016) cross-regional analysis, differences 
in the CoR do not seem to impinge on voters’ decisions to judge their rulers on their economic 
performance. Moreover, the finding that voters’ support for regional incumbents is influenced 
by perceived regional economic conditions represents an important contribution to the 
literature, which has so far found only mixed support for regional economic voting.  
We also found evidence of a ‘cross-level’ effect of economic perceptions in cases of 
vertical partisan congruence. This is true for the ‘top-down’ effect of perceptions of national 
economic conditions during regional elections, confirming their status as ‘second-order’ 
contests. There is also support for a ‘bottom-up’ effect, in which regional economic conditions 
affect support for the national incumbents. This suggests that, given the spatial limits that 
govern their everyday lives, voters may engage in a form of regional ‘socio-tropic’ voting and 
hold national incumbents accountable for the economic wellbeing that they can observe in their 
region, as much as for the state of the national economy. In cases of vertical incongruence, the 
effects of cross-level economic conditions were reversed: parties in regional and national office 
of a different label will tend to experience a fate that is opposite to that of their rivals in central 
or regional office. Interestingly, we found that, in these settings, part of this contrasting approval 
may result from the way in which parties in national or regional opposition will tend to be 
rewarded (or punished) for the perceived improved economic conditions produced by their co-
partisans in regional or national governments. Voters, it seems, consistently tend to assess 
economic performance on a partisan basis, across different levels of authority. 
This should offer good reason to adopt a more benevolent view of accountability in 
multi-level settings than has hitherto been espoused by the literature. Our findings suggest that, 
in fact, voters are skilfully able to navigate the complexity engendered by the compound nature 
of authority of multi-level systems. They hold their rulers accountable for the economic 
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outcomes that they perceive, but they can also use the system of multi-level elections to ‘signal’ 
their dissatisfaction with the performance of national and regional incumbents.  
Democratic accountability clearly works in multi-level settings, as there is evidence that 
‘same-level’ economic perceptions matter: voters assess regional and national incumbents as a 
function of perceived economic conditions prevailing in their respective jurisdictions. 
Moreover, this occurs across different types of federal systems, irrespectively of whether the 
formal allocation of competences between tiers may blur lines of responsibility. The presence 
of ‘cross-level’ effects of economic perceptions has more troubling implications for 
accountability, since incumbent governments are being evaluated for generating economic 
conditions which, in theory, do not lie in the province of their authority. The clearest instance 
of this is that, in cases of congruence, regional governments are being incorrectly evaluated 
according to a ‘second-order’ logic, for their co-partisans’ failings or achievements at the 
national level. However, it is worth underlying, first, that the strength of these cross-level effects 
is only half as strong as those found for the ‘same-level’ economic perceptions. Thus, overall, 
voters are accurately evaluating their different rulers’ performance during regional and national 
elections. Moreover, we can dwell on the finding that, in incongruent settings, the divergent 
fates of regional and national incumbents is not driven by an inaccurate and unfair judgement 
of their respective performance – say, the sanctioning of a national government for positive 
regional economic conditions – but rather by the consistent support of regional incumbents’ co-
partisans in opposition at the national level, for their good performance. 
This suggests an alternative and positive interpretation of this pattern of behaviour: 
voters take valence and competence signals from governing arrangements and apply these to 
other levels, conditional on whether the same or a different party governs there. Thus, voters 
are prepared to use elections at different levels to signal their (dis) satisfaction with the state of 
the economy at one level by rewarding an incumbent’s co-partisans at another. While this may 
not be ideal for those concerned with maintaining sharply divided lines of accountability in 
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multi-level settings, it nevertheless shows that voters appear to be keenly aware of how partisan 
politics and government-opposition dynamics work in multi-level settings. 
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